

itself in Nigeria, too. When Shagari won reelection in 1983, voting patterns showed blatant manipulation: the list of voters proved to contain 65 million names, although Nigerians of voting age were probably not two-thirds that numerous.

Economic problems worsened the political ones. Annual oil earnings peaked at \$25 billion in 1981 but fell to a fraction of that in the late 1980s. The foreign debt rose correspondingly to \$25 billion. Austerity measures had to be imposed as early as 1982, especially because Nigeria had lost agricultural self-sufficiency and had to import basics like sugar and rice.

The Second Republic fell to a military coup in 1983, followed by another that brought to power Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993). He completed Nigeria's economic transition away from policies aimed at providing basic human needs and toward export-oriented strategies. Playing to Nigerian patriotism, he refused to accept IMF terms for the economy, yet he implemented the same kind of structural adjustment program. That reduced the practical difference of not cooperating with the IMF to inflicting the pain of structural adjustments on ordinary Nigerians without getting the benefit of an IMF loan. His plan devalued the currency, raised the price of imports, abolished commodity marketing boards to restore agricultural producers' incentives, and aimed to privatize government firms. The resulting disaster provoked wide-spread protest and increased state violence. Prices increased tenfold, and the foreign debt rose to an unmanageable \$30 billion.

Politically, Babangida proposed a five-year, phased return to civilian rule. A new constitution was drafted, in 1991 the number of states was increased to thirty, and the capital was moved from Lagos to Abuja, a central, more neutral location (see Map 14.2). By not collecting the religious or ethnic data that had made earlier attempts controversial, the government

managed to carry out a census in 1991. It yielded a total of 89 million, nearly 20 million less than earlier estimates inflated by ethnic and religious interests. Babangida thoroughly manipulated the supposed return to civilian rule, however, attempting to set up the 1993 presidential election so as to produce no clear result. When the popular Chief Moshood Abiola won 58 percent of the vote anyway, Babangida annulled the election. A successful businessman who could probably have managed the economy better, Abiola landed in prison.

Nigeria plunged into five more years of crisis, dominated by Babangida's deputy and successor, General Sani Abacha (1993-1998). The return to civilian rule had to wait until 1999. In words from songs of its most popular public figure, Afrobeat singer Fela Anikulapó-Kuti, Nigeria, too long ruled by "animals in human skins," would remain a land of "suffering and smiling."

South Africa: Inequality, Exploitation, Isolation

Until 1948, South Africa's history had been that of two struggles—one between British and Afrikaners for political power, the other between whites and Africans for control of land and labor (see Chapter 8). The introduction of apartheid in 1948 under the Afrikaner-dominated Nationalist party, which remained in power for nearly half a century, marked the victory of the whites, especially the Afrikaners. With the old dual struggle settled, South Africa embarked on a period of prolonged economic growth, but its political system became more exclusionary than ever. The result was a new struggle that pitted Africans vying for political as well as economic power against the ruling white minority. Not until 1994, long after white rule had collapsed everywhere else in Africa, did South Africa's isolation and bizarre internal contradictions force it, too, to risk change by accepting majority rule.

White Domination, Economic and Political

Into the 1980s, growth and inequality became more than ever the dominant traits of South Africa's economy. Minerals remained basic to its prosperity. South Africa ranked first in the world in reserves of gold, platinum, chrome, manganese, and vanadium. The country ranked second in reserves of diamonds and between third and eighth in antimony, asbestos, coal, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, titanium, and perhaps uranium. The land produced a sizable agricultural surplus for export, at the price of malnourishment for millions of Africans in the black reserves. By 1965, the country was virtually self-sufficient in heavy industry, and manufactured goods accounted for 40 percent of exports. As before World War II, the state controlled key industries, particularly in energy, one field in which South Africa had resource shortages. With no known petroleum resources, the government founded SASOL (South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation) in the 1950s to manufacture oil from coal. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979 deprived South Africa of its one regular source of oil, efforts began to expand SASOL's production. South Africa also developed nuclear power and began exploring for offshore petroleum.

Another resource essential for South Africa's economic growth was nonwhite labor, exploited through bad working conditions and grossly unequal pay. In 1984, the average salary for whites was almost four times that for Africans. African living standards were especially bad in the black homelands, which reserved 13 percent of the land for over 70 percent of the population. South Africa's exploitation of blacks did not stop at its borders. The mines had long employed migrants from as far north as Zambia (see Map 14.1). This practice increased the supply, and lowered the price, of black labor in South Africa. It also helped ensure South Africa's regional dominance.

Exploitative but resource rich, the South African economy grew at an average annual rate of nearly 7 percent from 1910 to 1974, an astonishing record. The OPEC oil price increases and other factors then caused a crisis. When the United States stopped buying and selling gold at a fixed \$35 per ounce in 1971, however, the world price soared, reaching an all-time high of \$875 an ounce in January 1980. Despite wide fluctuations, gold price increases of such an order for a time helped pull South Africa back out of recession. But drought and commodity price declines caused a new downturn by 1983. From 1984 on, the costs of virtual black rebellion at home and trade sanctions abroad—South Africa's coal exports fell by 40 percent in the first half of 1987—created new pressures that left South Africa scrambling for solutions. The government privatized even key state firms like SASOL, the oil-from-coal concern, and planned to create new indirect taxes to raise revenue from those too poor to pay income tax. Meanwhile, growing labor militancy highlighted the contradiction inherent in trying to separate economically interdependent races, especially in a complex economy in which growth required placing nonwhites in more and better jobs.

In politics, South Africa remained formally a parliamentary democracy. Yet changes over time greatly eroded resemblances to the original British model. From 1948 until 1994, for example, the Afrikaner-dominated National party always controlled the government. Single-party rule signaled the Afrikaners' political triumph over the English-speaking South Africans. In 1961, when the country declared itself a republic and severed ties with the British Commonwealth, British influence further diminished.

The character and policies of selected prime ministers reinforced this trend. With the Nationalist party victory in 1948, Prime Minister D. F. Malan (1948-1954) formed the first

government to consist of Afrikaners only. Its legislation systematized racial separation (apartheid). The consistency of the governments from then on derived not just from the party but also from a larger complex of Afrikaner interest groups. The most important was the Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood, founded 1918). Under National party rule, all prime ministers and virtually all Afrikaners in public life were members of this secret society, whose members largely formulated the apartheid idea. The triumph of such interests meant a shift from British-style restraint toward Afrikaner authoritarianism—a shift abetted by English-speaking South Africans' belief in white supremacy, if not always in Afrikaner methods.

Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd (1958–1966) reflected this shift. A former Nazi sympathizer, he fulfilled the Afrikaner dream of a republic without links to Britain. At the same time his policy of separate development aimed at transforming the native reserves into homelands that would become “independent,” theoretically quite separate from the white republic.

The first prime minister to react significantly to the collapse of white rule in neighboring countries was P.W. Botha (1978–1984). But his new constitution (1984) still made only limited political concessions to coloreds (persons of mixed race) and Asians and none at all to Africans. By then, such limited concessions were clearly inadequate responses to the forces they were meant to contain.

Apartheid in Action

Over time, South African racial policy became minutely regulated and rigidified. The bases for apartheid long predated 1948. The Native Land Act of 1913 created the Native Reserves, the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923 segregated black residents of towns, and the Native Representation Act of 1936 removed Africans from the common voter rolls in Cape Province. From 1948 on, discriminatory laws proliferated.

By 1960, they had transformed South Africa into a racially based caste society. The purpose was to separate racial categories—white, colored, Asian, African—in every way possible and to deny political participation to the nonwhite categories, all three of which are known in South Africa as “black.” Apartheid was to ensure white minority control by “dividing and ruling” and by maximizing inequality. Africans were not even supposed to reside permanently except in small parts of the country set aside for their various ethnic groups, whose differences were emphasized to fragment the African majority. Africans were to go elsewhere only as temporary migrant workers. They had to carry passes so that their movements could be controlled, and they could hold only jobs not reserved for whites. First set up for the mining industry, the system assumed that migrant workers were bachelors who did not need a “family” wage. Wages were further depressed by bringing in workers from other countries, as noted. Since jobs for Africans—including industrial and domestic jobs, as well as those in mining—were mostly remote from the places where they were supposed to reside, the impact of such labor conditions on African family life was drastic, through either long-term family separation or extremely long daily commuting times, in addition to inadequate pay. In fact, because most jobs for Africans were in cities, it proved impossible for the government to make all Africans live in rural reserves. The main response to this was the creation of segregated “townships,” like Soweto, in which Africans who worked in the cities had to live, far from their jobs.

Bad working and living conditions indicated the dehumanizing intent of apartheid, but did not show its full extent. Under the Promotion of Self Government Act (1959), the many native reserves were consolidated into ten tribal homelands, or bantustans. The consolidation was only administrative, for the homelands still consisted of scattered pieces of

land. Still, Prime Minister Verwoerd, mastermind of the policy, argued that just as whites could find fulfillment only in a state they controlled, "separate development" was the key to fulfillment for each African ethnic group. The ultimate fulfillment was to be the homelands' "independence," which would provide the excuse to deprive homeland residents of South African citizenship.

In 1976, South Africa began giving "independence" to some homelands. No other nation recognized them as independent nations, however, and some ethnic groups refused to accept this status. Set aside for the Ndebele, an ethnic group that historically had no home in South Africa, the "homeland" KwaNdebele was in fact a dumping ground for ethnically mixed elements ejected from the cities under the pass system. Nowhere did the government's concern for ethnic fulfillment extend to economic development or good government. In fact, part of the government's strategy was to bring ruthless people to power within the impoverished homelands, then watch the residents divide into warring bands as henchmen, or opponents, of their government-backed "leaders."

As the homeland policy developed, segregation and inequality worsened in countless other ways. Not only was education segregated at all levels, but the requirement that African children be educated in their various ethnic languages for the first eight years played up ethnic differences and left the children unprepared for secondary or higher education in English or Afrikaans. Other laws were designed to protect racial barriers by prohibiting mixed marriages (1949) and interracial sex outside marriage (1957), or by requiring people over sixteen to carry an identity card specifying their race (1950). The Suppression of Communism Act (1950) defined *communism* as practically any attempt to change the status quo. What whites lacked in numbers, they sought to make up through socioeconomic advantage,

control of the state, and unrestrained use of the state's coercive power.

As prime minister (1978-1984) and then president (1984-1989), P. W. Botha reacted to the erosion of white power elsewhere in Africa by readjusting foreign and domestic policy. In addition to neighboring countries' economic dependency, long since effected by employing migrant miners, Botha sought to achieve a regional dominance not unlike that of the United States over Central America. For this purpose, South Africa fought its opponents on neighboring states' territory and supported movements hostile to unfriendly regimes in those states. South Africa invaded Angola repeatedly after 1975 and supported an opposition movement, UNITA, against the Cuban-backed Angolan government. To undermine the Afro-Marxist government of neighboring Mozambique, South Africa also supported the so-called Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO in Portuguese), in origin not a nationalist movement but a mercenary force that ravaged the country until an internationally brokered ceasefire in 1992. Diplomatically, Botha sought agreements that would keep opponents of the regime, particularly the African National Congress, from operating out of neighboring countries. Namibia, controlled by South Africa since the end of World War I, remained a special case. As part of a U.S.-mediated attempt to end the Angolan civil war, however, South Africa finally agreed to Namibia's becoming independent in 1990. The apparent motive was to spare South Africa's white minority the costs and casualties of armed intervention.

Internally, Botha made certain concessions to nonwhites. For the African majority, concessions were mostly limited to the field of labor relations. African and mixed labor unions received official recognition (1979). As the need for skilled labor grew, Botha also gave Africans some recognition as permanent residents of urban areas by letting them buy their

own houses—but not the land—in the townships. Since the 1960s, a system of local councils had existed in nonwhite areas. Yet administering and policing the townships remained insoluble problems, for institutionalizing these services would mean admitting what the homeland policy denied: that Africans' urban presence was legitimate.

The two other nonwhite communities, the coloreds and Asians, represented about 9 and 3 percent, respectively, of the estimated 1988 population of 35 million, compared with about 15 and 73 percent for whites and Africans. Botha's 1984 constitution made political concessions to the two smaller groups. Creating separate elected national assemblies for each of them as well as for the whites, the constitution created a complicated governmental system in which an extremely powerful executive president replaced the prime minister. The official reason for not making such concessions to Africans was that they had political institutions in the homelands. Taking another step away from British parliamentarism but offering the African majority nothing, the 1984 constitution intensified African opposition to white rule.

In the long run, the African majority's response to these maneuvers would be the most important one, but it was not the only consequence Botha had to consider. The 1984 constitution and African opposition to it raised international awareness of South African racism to new levels, symbolized by the economic sanctions that European and North American governments imposed on South Africa and by mounting demands for multinational firms to disinvest from South Africa and stop doing business there. Inside South Africa, controversy racked the white minority. Ultra-rightists assailed the Botha government for making concessions to nonwhites. Moderates, including business people concerned about international sanctions and about how the systematic impoverishment of three-quarters of

the population limited the market for consumer goods, advocated further change. Some analysts argued that apartheid's costs would kill it, if nothing else did. Aside from the costs of military intervention abroad and repression at home, the 1984 constitution increased the number of cabinet members and members of parliament many times over while civil service payrolls grew to one-third of government spending. Such issues are worth keeping in mind as we examine black African opposition to apartheid and the end of white rule.

African Responses to Apartheid

Black South Africans' radicalization was already beginning during World War II. In the African National Congress (ANC), young intellectuals, such as Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela, grew dissatisfied with older leaders and formed a new pressure group, the ANC Youth League. They won control of the ANC in 1949 and pushed through a program of strikes, civil disobedience, and noncooperation. During the 1950s, the ANC still emphasized civil disobedience campaigns in collaboration with Indian, colored, and liberal white organizations. This phase culminated at a Congress of the People that adopted the Freedom Charter (1955). Asserting that South Africa's people, black and white, were "equal, countrymen and brothers," and would work together for democratic change, the charter lastingly defined ANC ideology.

Reactions to the Congress of the People opened a new phase in the history of the African opposition. The government responded by passing more repressive laws and arresting 156 people, including leaders of the congress. They were charged with conspiring to overthrow the state and replace it with a communist one. All the defendants were later released, but not until 1961 in some cases.

Meanwhile, African activists began to differ about nonviolence and cooperation with

other racial groups. One group wanted a purely African movement that would use any means to ensure majority rule. It broke from the ANC and formed the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1959. Seeking to retain leadership, the ANC planned a civil disobedience campaign against the pass system for late March 1960. But the PAC launched a similar campaign a few days earlier. At Sharpeville, near Johannesburg, the police shot at the demonstrators, killing 67 and wounding almost 200. When demonstrations ensued, the government mobilized the armed forces, outlawed both the ANC and the PAC, and jailed some 18,000 Africans, with much violence. With both the ANC and the PAC forced underground, even men like Tambo and Mandela concluded that nonviolence—after the response it got at the Sharpeville massacre—would not work for their movement.

The ANC then organized an underground group, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), which carried out its first act of sabotage in December 1961. The group's first commander, Nelson Mandela, was captured in 1962 and given a life sentence. Repeatedly offered freedom if he would renounce violence, Mandela's steadfast refusals made him South Africa's most revered leader. By 1963, all ANC leaders but Tambo, who had gone abroad to found an exile branch, had been captured. For the remainder of the 1960s, the government managed to repress other anti-regime organizations as well.

When black activism resurfaced inside the country, it focused at first on issues arising from segregation in education. Influenced by the U.S. civil rights movement, a black consciousness movement emerged to challenge the white liberals' idea of integrating blacks into white society. The movement's slogan became "Black man, you're on your own." The government began cracking down in 1973. In 1976, the attempt to impose Afrikaans as a language of instruction in the Soweto schools brought out thousands of children to demonstrate. When the police shot a student, protests swept the land. The govern-

ment response left 575 dead, of whom only 5 were white and 134 were younger than eighteen. Ruthless repression led many activists to join ANC forces abroad. Inside South Africa, anti-regime organizations continued to form, such as the Soweto Civic Association and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO). Defiance spread among all three subordinate castes.

In the period between the Soweto uprising and the 1984 constitution, the struggle proceeded both inside and outside South Africa. Inside, Africans had some leaders who still emphasized nonviolence, such as Desmond Tutu, Anglican bishop of Johannesburg. Among resistance groups, the most important event inside the country in this period was the creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF, 1983), an umbrella organization that combined hundreds of groups with some 1.5 million members. The UDF shared the ANC commitment to interracial collaboration and was therefore opposed by groups like PAC and AZAPO, which rejected white participation.

Externally, the exile branch of the ANC remained the main opposition force after Soweto. In the early 1980s, it conducted military operations from foreign bases, bombing South Africa's main oil-from-coal plant (1980), a new nuclear plant (1982), and South African air force headquarters (1983). As at Sharpeville in 1960, the government responded disproportionately to such acts.

The ANC's actions paled, however, compared to the violence inside South Africa after September 1984. Sparked both by attempts to increase rents on government-owned township houses and by the new constitution, disturbances occurred all over the country in a way that made them harder to control than earlier, localized incidents. From abroad, the ANC had long called for making the townships ungovernable. This now happened in townships and homelands alike, but the ANC was only the symbol of resistance, not its organizer.

In South Africa, too, political mobilization was rising to a new level. Africans, and even-



Passive Resistance, by Reshada Crouse, commissioned for the Nelson Mandela Theater, Johannesburg (1994). Liberty leads a diverse group of South Africans, particularly actors, whose work helped keep South Africa's transition to majority rule comparatively peaceful. Crouse's painting alludes to a famous prototype, Delacroix's *Liberty Leading the People* (1830). But hers depicts non-violence, whereas his portrays revolutionary violence. *Passive Resistance*, oil on canvas, 1999, by Reshada Crouse, telephone: 011-27-11-648-9817


tually other nonwhites, challenged every aspect of repression. In the townships, Africans who had collaborated with the authorities by assuming leadership roles or, still worse, by serving as police informers faced summary execution by the "necklace"—an old tire placed around the neck, filled with gasoline, and set afire. Where competing political groups faced one another, violence became especially common, all the more when criminals took advantage of disorder to mask their own acts. Such was the "black-on-black" violence that the government cynically publicized, as if its own kind of "law and order" had nothing to do with what was happening. In the homelands, conflict raged between the corrupt and repressive government-backed leaders and their henchmen, on the one hand, and the young "comrades" who opposed them, on the other. There, too, the "necklace" became familiar. Even children took part in resistance through school boycotts organized by activist groups. The

resistance asserted itself economically, not only through rent strikes, which cost the government hundreds of millions of dollars, but also through boycotts of white businesses and through actions like the mineworkers' strike of August 1987, which caused over \$50 million in production losses to the country's largest gold-mining company.

Faced with such problems, the government declared a state of emergency (June 1986), detained tens of thousands of people without even allowing their names to be published, and banned all political activity by the UDF, African labor organizations, and other groups.

Toward Majority Rule

As South Africa approached mass political mobilization of a sort incompatible with survival of the existing order, signs of readiness for accommodation began to appear. P. W. Botha




Black South Africans get the vote, 1994. Nothing better symbolizes the spreading, global demands for democratization than the orderly line of people waiting to cast their ballots at Soweto. Denis Farrell/© AP-Wide World Photos

resigned from the presidency in August 1989. In 1990, his successor, F. W. de Klerk, lifted the ban on the ANC and—needing someone of stature to negotiate with—freed Nelson Mandela from prison. At this, the UDF disbanded and urged its affiliates to support the ANC.

These events launched a restructuring that depended on the two leaders' ability to work together and maintain their positions as leaders of the country's whites and blacks. With militant whites to de Klerk's right and many forces at work among the African population—most notably the Inkatha Freedom party, whose agenda combined Zulu ethnic reassertion and economic ideas to the right of the ANC's—success was not assured. De Klerk's government abolished apartheid in 1991, and foreign governments began lifting the sanctions they had

imposed. Having announced suspension of the armed struggle in 1990, the ANC held a national conference in July 1991. Electing Mandela its president and bringing members of a younger generation into other leadership positions, the conference looked like a step toward turning the ANC into a political party. The government agreed with the ANC and Inkatha to open negotiations for a new constitution, and the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) began meeting in December 1991. In March 1992, nearly 70 percent of the white electorate voted to end minority rule. Optimists predicted the formation within months of a multiracial interim government.

Progress was not so swift, however. Racial violence, abuses, and insubordination among government security forces; disclosures of



Map 14.3 South Africa's Postapartheid Provinces

corruption in homeland administration; and a deteriorating economy weakened de Klerk's position. The ANC had to face internal scandals, ongoing violence in homelands and townships, and opposition from both the Left and Inkatha. Yet by February 1993, the government and the ANC had agreed that white rule would end in April 1994 with the election of a new parliament, which would serve for five years and write a new constitution. Black South Africans would get to vote in the 1994 elec-

tion, and minority parties—which would thenceforth include the Nationalist party—would be eligible to participate in the interim government of the next five years. The ANC emerged from the 1994 elections with a clear majority, Mandela as president, and de Klerk as one of two deputy presidents. With the adoption in 1996 of the new constitution, including an extensive bill of rights, South Africa officially completed one of the world's most difficult democratization processes.

Conclusion: Moving Beyond Change Without Development?

Africa was the last of the continents to be integrated into the European-dominated global pattern of the pre-1914 era and the last to be formally decolonized. Mostly becoming independent in the 1960s, just as the Third World population explosion was emerging as a policy problem that could no longer be ignored, Africa's nations remained impoverished despite their natural resources, disunited, plagued by corruption, and politically unable to resist military authoritarianism. The oil-related stresses of the 1970s and 1980s seriously affected all African countries, including the few that had oil to export. By the late 1980s, the same pressures for democratization were at work in Africa as in Latin America. Caught between foreign debt, the ecological and socioeconomic consequences of the demographic explosion, and the ravages of AIDS, African nations had difficulty responding to the new trend. Optimistic observers pointed out, however, that South Africa was not the only African country to respond positively. A number of conflicts that had echoed the Cold War had ended. More widely still, with the spread of at least elementary education, the era of authoritarian mobilization behind small cadres of nationalist leaders had ended. Demand for democratization had begun to acquire a broader human base, even as the claims of ethnic and regional particularism continued to make themselves heard. African societies that could build on this momentum to achieve greater success in national integration and human development might be able to move beyond Nigeria's corruption or Somalia's chaos to achieve a "second revolution" of democratization and improve their relative position in the era of globalization. As one Nigerian voter put it in February 1999, "Globally, things are going democratically. We want to join the globe."⁴

Notes

1. Blaine Harden, "Africa's Gems: Warfare's Best Friend," *New York Times*, April 6, 2000, pp. A1, A10-A11; Robert Black, "Diamonds Lie Behind Africa Bloodshed," *Wall Street Journal*, May 12, 2000, pp. A14, A16; Glenn R. Simpson, "U.N. Ties al Qaeda Figure to Diamonds," *Wall Street Journal*, June 28, 2004, pp. A3, A8; Mike Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "Terror Watch: Tangled Ties, Law-Enforcement Officials Follow the Money Trail Among Suspected Terrorists Straight to the Doors of the Saudi Embassy," *Newsweek Web Exclusive*, April 7, 2004; Doug Farah, *Blood from Stones* (New York: Broadway Books, 2004); Katherine Ozment, "Who's Afraid of Aafia Siddiqui," *Boston Magazine*, October 2004, www.bostonmagazine.com.
2. Stephen McCarthy, *Africa: The Challenge of Transformation* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 97, 118-119, 195.
3. Quoted *ibid.*, p. 197.
4. Statement of Ndubuisi Ebubeogu, a shipping worker, at polls in Ajengule, a Lagos slum, as quoted in Norimitsu Onishi, "Nigerians Vote, with High Hopes for Civilian Rule," *New York Times*, February 28, 1999, p. 1.

Suggestions for Further Reading

Books

- Achebe, Chinua. *A Man of the People* (1966).
- Crowder, Michael. *The Story of Nigeria* (1978).
- Davidson, Basil. *Modern Africa: A Social and Political History*. 3d ed. (1994).
- Falola, Toyin. *The History of Nigeria* (1999).
- Falola, Toyin. *Key Events in African History: A Reference Guide* (2002).
- Fieldhouse, D. K. *Black Africa, 1945-1980: Economic Decolonization and Arrested Development* (1986).
- Mazrui, Ali. *The Africans: A Triple Heritage* (1986).
- McCarthy, Stephen. *Africa: The Challenge of Transformation* (1994).

Oliver, Roland. *The African Experience: From Olduvai Gorge to the Twenty-First Century* (2000).

Oliver, Roland, and Anthony Atmore. *Africa Since 1800*. 4th ed. (1994).

Soyinka, Wole. *The Open Sore of a Continent, A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis* (1996).

Thompson, Leonard. *A History of South Africa*. 3d ed. (2001).

United Nations Development Program. *Human Development Report*, annual.

World Bank. *World Development Report*, annual.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Africa Report.

Africa Research Bulletin.

Jeune Afrique L'intelligent (*Young Africa the Intelligent One*, French-language weekly published in Paris).